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RECENT TENDENCIES IN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF VALUES.

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The psychologist with an eye to the larger aspects of the development of his subject would doubtless learn much from a study of the distribution of topics in the magazine literature during a period of fifteen or twenty years. Among other things he would find, I venture to think, a close dependence of psychological tendencies upon larger philosophical interests and trends. Whatever may be said, from the standpoint of academical discussion, as to the proper affiliations of psychology — whether with philosophy or natural science — it must at least be admitted that up to the present time it has been from philosophy chiefly that psychology has derived its problems.

With such a premise one might have been led, even some years ago, to predict the present revival of interest in the psychology of feeling and will, especially as developed from the point of view of the theory of value. The gradual shifting of the philosophical center of gravity from the problem of knowledge to the problem of values has, for some time now, been creating a body of questions which must, after all is said and done, go to psychological matter of fact for their answers. The sharp antithesis of facts and values might, indeed, temporarily delay the appeal to psychological analysis, but the simple and inevitable necessity of the situation — that every assertion of a worth involves likewise the assertion of its conformity with actual or possible experiences of feeling and will, and their laws — makes the appeal to psychology ultimately unavoidable.

There are, indeed, not lacking certain indications of an actual historical connection between, for instance, the philosophical 'transvaluation of values' attempted by Nietzsche and this new interest in the psychology of valuation; between the recent fideistic tendencies in

France and the interest of Ribot, Paulhan and their followers in a *logique des sentiments* and the theory of affective abstracts; and one might almost venture the prediction that the claim of Pragmatism, that the truth judgment is a form of valuation, must, when we have finally got through with more abstract questions, lead us to a consideration of the question already discussed in other quarters, viz., the relations between knowledge feelings and feelings of value.

Be all this as it may, the appearance in the magazine literature of the last couple years of a concentration of interest upon the topics of value (and feeling in general), sufficient to merit the dignity of characterization as a tendency, gives rise to the hope that the psychology of feeling and will is coming to a consciousness of its function as the foundation of the Geisteswissenschaften which deal with values. Simmel's remarkable book, *Die Philosophie des Geldes*, is merely one indication of what trained psychological analysis may contribute both to the adequate formulation and the solution of the larger problems of a theory of value.

This tendency is the more welcome also because hitherto it has been precisely this region of psychology concerned with feeling and will which has remained most undeveloped. A recent contributor to these pages¹ has called attention to the confusion and divergence of opinion as to both object and method in the psychology of feeling. He might have gone further and pointed out that this condition has been due largely to the absence of any central problem, any heuristic principle, which should control analysis. Such a principle and method was indeed furnished by Meinong over a decade ago when, in his epoch-making book, *Psychologische-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie*, he announced the principle that the way to the psychology of feeling lay through worth analysis. But until recently the principle remained practically unheeded. The psychology of feeling remained in a wholly phenomenal stage, the question of its functional meaning being largely ignored, and even the phenomenological study was hampered and obscured by the bodily transference of the machinery of the doctrine of elements and their compounding from the region of sensation and perception, where it has a certain methodological value, to the sphere of feeling where its influence has been wholly disturbing.

To the scanty array of books and monographs which owe their inspiration directly or indirectly to Meinong's work² there has been

¹C. H. Johnson, 'The Present State of the Psychology of Feeling,' *PSYCH. BULLETIN*, 1905, II.

²Cf. the article on 'Worth' in the *Dictionary of Philos. and Psych.*

recently added, as was said, a growing body of magazine literature. A glance at this literature indicates, as might have been expected, that it is Meinong's definition and analysis which has brought it into being, and that, moreover, while it is still concerned with foundations, with questions of definition, there are nevertheless distinguishable a certain unanimity in regard to the nature of the fundamental problems and a certain definite trend of opinion with reference to their solution. The purely psychological problems are three in number. The first is concerned with the *intension* of the definition of worth experience,—is value to be equated with experiences of feeling or desire?—the question of a voluntaristic or affective theory of value. The second problem is one of *differentia*, the differentiation of experiences of value from other experiences of feeling or desire, as the case may be. Here the discussion centers about the formulation of Meinong, that only such feelings as presuppose existential judgments are feelings of value. The third question, closely connected with the second, relates to the *extension* of the definition, the extent of the sphere of worth experience,—more particularly as to its inclusion of aesthetic feelings and feelings of knowledge, certainty, probability, etc. Here the discussion centers largely about Meinong's (and Witasek's) exclusion of the aesthetic from feelings of value.

With regard to the first problem the trend of opinion is decidedly in favor of the affective theory. In addition to the well known works of Meinong and Lipps, the more recent articles of Wilhelmine Liel,¹ of Dürr,² and of Edith Landmann-Kalischer³ contain criticisms, the first of Schwarz's, the latter two of Ehrenfels' formulation of the voluntaristic theory. Without going into the details of the discussion, it may be fairly said, I think, that the case against the voluntaristic theory is practically closed. It is found impossible to equate all types of worth attitude with actual desire, and it is further seen that desire itself as an actual experience presupposes worth feeling.

About the second problem the discussion rages more fiercely, but the weight of the argument seems to be against Meinong's limitation of feelings of value to feelings determined by judgment, and in favor of the inclusion of pre-judgmental and post-judgmental attitudes, more

¹ 'Gegen eine voluntaristische Begründung der Werththeorie,' article in Meinong's *Zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie* (reviewed by the present writer in the *Philosophical Review*, January, 1906).

² 'Zur Frage der Wertbestimmung,' *Archiv für die gesammte Psychologie*, 1905, Bd. VI., Heft 3.

³ 'Ueber den Erkenntniswert ästhetischer Urteile,' *Archiv für die gesammte Psychologie*, 1905, Bd. V.

especially in favor of the inclusion of the æsthetic in the sphere of worth experience. In varying forms this view is maintained by Lipps,¹ Dürr,² Landmann-Kalischer.³ But it should be noted that while they join in criticism of Meinong's positive definition, there is equal unanimity in favor of the validity of his negative conclusion, that feeling of value is not to be identified with mere 'pleasure-causation,' with feeling viewed merely as the feeling tone of presentation and sensation or as effect of any condition whatsoever, psychological or physiological. It is only feeling attitude, feeling as directed upon an object, which constitutes worth experience. The chief desideratum at present may then be said to be unanimity in the characterization of the conditions or presuppositions of feeling of value, the adequate characterization of the pre-judgmental and post-judgmental attitude.

This fundamental problem of analysis has received its most searching examination in the interesting discussion of Lipps and Meinong, extending through several numbers of the *Archiv für die gesammte Psychologie*, a discussion which arose primarily in connection with the third problem, as to the inclusion or exclusion of æsthetic feelings. In his first article, 'Weiteres zur Einfühlung,' Lipps maintains, primarily in opposition to Witasek's contention that æsthetic feelings are not real but merely imagined (Schein) feelings, the *real* character of the projected feelings in æsthetic *Einfühlung*. To this end the whole question of the validity of the definition of feelings of value, as feelings with existential judgments as their presuppositions, is critically considered and rejected, and an attempt made to define the primary worth experience. His chief contention is that the feeling of reality is the necessary presupposition of the æsthetic experience (therefore of *Einfühlung*) no less than of the practical and ethical, that the æsthetic object is not merely presented, *sembed*, playfully assumed to exist, but is taken as real. But reality feeling does not necessitate existential judgment. Rather is the essential of reality feeling (and with it of worth experience) feelings of activity — in the case of the æsthetic, feelings of activity read into the object — the feelings of activity being conditioned by the pre-determined relation of the object to the conative self. The judgment is therefore unessential to the feeling of value and, even in the case where it enters as part of the total condition of the feeling, it is merely an act (not activity)

¹ 'Weiteres zur Einfühlung.' *Archiv für die gesammte Psych.*, 1905, Bd. IV.
² 'Ueber Urteilsgefühle,' *Ibid.*, Bd. VII., 1906.

³ Cited above.

³ Cited above.

making explicit the experience through acknowledgment of the object. 'Judgment-feelings' are knowledge feelings, feelings of certainty, probability, etc., and therefore only secondary determinants of the feeling of value.

Meinong, in his paper, 'Urtheilsgefühle, was sie sind und was sie nicht sind,'¹ replies to the criticism of Lipps with a further elaboration of his own position and with a criticism of Lipps' description of feelings of value as feelings of activity and his characterization of judgment feelings as knowledge feelings. In this restatement of his position Meinong makes quite clear, for one thing, a point hitherto somewhat obscure — that he has never meant in his judgment criterion anything but judgment in the full logical sense of the word. But while existential judgment is the presupposition of the joy or sorrow which characterizes feelings of value, this judgment is not necessarily categorical but may be hypothetical or disjunctive or even the quasi-logical assumption mode. All these have existence as their *objective*. The main point is that these are not secondary and non-essential, as Lipps maintains, but constitutive. Nor are they knowledge feelings. The real point of difference between knowledge and aesthetic feelings on the one hand, and feelings of value on the other, is that the former have merely *objects*, while the latter *objectives*; the former are concerned only with the *what*, the latter with the *that*, the existence of the object. Only feelings which have objectives are feelings of value. The reality of the aesthetic feelings, the demand of the aesthetically given, as described by Lipps, is of the same sort as the *what* of the sphere of knowledge, predetermined by constructive activities of the subject, but not existent. The object indeed accepted, but not acknowledged as existent.

Of Lipps' reply 'Ueber Urtheilsgefühle,' full as it is of subtle and enlightening analyses, we can note only one point, but that which is decisive and upon which he concentrates his effort. What does Meinong really mean by this expression *objective* (and his distinction of *object* from *objective*), this existence which is given only in judgment? Can he mean anything except the demand of the object upon our acceptance? From the point of view of psychological analysis certainly nothing but this. Now judgment is, to be sure, the later admission, acknowledgment, of this demand (Forderung), but the feeling of reality which comes with the demand is prior to this act of acknowledgment. These demands are of various types — some more subjective, some more objective than others — but the existential predicate constitutes the acceptance of only one type of demand and therefore only

¹ *Archiv für die gesammte Psychologie*, 1905, Bd. VI.

one phase of reality feeling. Unhindered activity is the source of feelings of value, as feelings of reality. The predetermined aesthetic object is one field of such activity, is one form of objective or demand. The judgment of existence merely registers the fact that a demand has maintained itself in opposition to other demands, is merely a secondary modification of the primary feeling of reality and value.

It appears, to the present writer at least, that this discussion has done much to clear the air. Through it, it is to be hoped, both Meinong and Lipps will be led to modify the unpsychological elements in their definitions; for both of them err in this direction, the one finding the criterion of the feeling of value in a transcendental distinction between object and objective, the other in an equally transcendental distinction between the self and the not-self. The difficulty in Meinong's conception arises from his extreme distinction between the *what* and the *that* (the *Sosein* and *Sein*) criticized by the present writer at more length in another connection.¹ The essentially derived and secondary character of the existential judgment—as an explicit acknowledgment of a reality coefficient, a demand, a *coefficient of control*, to use Professor Baldwin's admirable term—seems undeniable. It is the mere acceptance of a demand or control, whether objective or subjective (dispositional) in origin, which constitutes the presupposition of feelings of value. No other conception is psychological and genetic. On the other hand, Lipps is equally unpsychological and ungenetic when he makes the relation of the feeling to the ego the criterion of feelings of value. The consciousness of this relation (the acknowledgment of subjective control), is as secondary and derived as the existential judgment. A definition and classification of feelings of value must be genetic in character and include pre-judgmental, judgmental and post-judgmental attitudes.

In this connection the definition of Dürr, in the paper already referred to, although purely analytical, is interesting as seeking to include all the various types of attitude which constitute worth experience.

In addition to these discussions of fundamental questions there are certain other recent developments in the analysis of feeling which demand brief notice in view of their close connection with the general psychological theory of values. For one thing they afford ground for the view that the most fruitful contributions to the psychology of feeling in general must come from analysis of worth experience. Since the introduction of the concepts of *Scheingefühle*, presented feelings

¹ In the review of *Zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie*, already referred to.

and assumption feelings, and their use on a large scale by Witasek in his *Aesthetik*, there has been a further development by Saxinger in two papers,¹ in which he subjects these supposed phenomena to closer analysis and seeks to determine their laws. We may, as the present writer does, agree with Lipps, in the article already considered, that the concept of an unreal feeling is unpsychological, if not untenable from any point of view, and with J. Segal² that the concepts of Schein-gefühl and Gefühlsvorstellung have had unfortunate results for recent æsthetic theory, and at the same time recognize the new facts which this view has brought to light.

The main point of Saxinger's studies is the differentiation, both as to characteristics and mode of origin, of certain aspects or phases of feeling (and desire) known as feelings and desires of the imagination, from the real feelings, and to determine their function in the continuous life of feeling and conation. They differ from actual feeling, it is held, merely in the fact that they have assumptions instead of judgments as presuppositions and are not subject to diminution of intensity through repetition. From this difference with respect to the law governing intensity of feeling he infers totally different dispositions as the basis of the actualization of the feelings, and by an analysis of concrete cases seeks to show that each type of feeling is independent of the influence of the other, although admitting that the feelings of the imagination may function as representative 'feeling signs' for actual worth feelings. All his analyses indicate that he has before his mind the same phenomena as have been variously characterized as affective signs, affective generals and affective abstracts, in connection with which this fact of independence of the law of diminution of intensity with repetition has already been noted. In fact he seeks to identify these phenomena with his feelings of imagination, describing them 'as feelings of the imagination attaching directly through habit with substrate ideas, this direct attachment to be explained from specific dispositions to feelings of the imagination actualized by abstract ideas.'

As to this identification, it seems clear that Saxinger is merely studying from the point of view of functional presuppositions the same phenomena which the theory of affective abstracts sought to take account of in their aspect of content. This later contribution will probably

¹ Saxinger, 'Ueber die Natur der Phantasiegefühle und Phantasiebegehrungen,' *Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie* (reviewed by present writer, *Philosophical Review*, January, 1896). 'Beiträge zur Lehre von den emotionalen Phantasie,' *Zeitschrift für Psychol.*, Bd. XI., Heft 3.

² 'Die bewusste Selbsttäuschung als Kern des æsthetischen Geniessens,' *Archiv für die gesammte Psychol.*, 1905, Bd. VI.

enable us to see more clearly their functional rôle as representatives of actual particular emotions, but if one may venture an assertion without developing the grounds (which would be here impossible), it is more than probable that the position that these are feelings of imagination, *toto genere* different from real feelings, with different dispositional basis and neither modifying nor being modified by real feelings of value, will prove untenable. They are but special modifications, meanings, of real feelings; and their representative capacity arises from that fact. In this connection it is interesting to note, merely in passing, that the latest contribution from the French psychologists to this question¹ indicates a tendency to seek a functional explanation of the origin of emotional abstracts, instead of explaining them as fusions of feelings or as merely sharing in the generalization of the ideas they accompany.

No attempt, it may be said in conclusion, has recently been made in the direction of larger, more constructive work, unless the work of Simmel, already referred to, be considered. Despite the brilliancy of its analyses and the fund of psychological suggestions which it contains, its main object is philosophical and social rather than psychological. The earlier attempts at systematic constructions (Meinong and Ehrenfels) were too largely built upon principles not firmly enough established, and also influenced by philosophical pre-conceptions. The present activity, largely critical and foundational, indicates certain definite trends, but can be said to furnish scarcely more than materials for more constructive work. A constructive principle is still lacking—and this, it appears to the present writer, must be genetic in character. When once analysis has determined with some degree of unanimity the pre-judgmental, post-judgmental and judgmental attitudes in valuation, it may then be possible to show them in their genetic developmental relations. The various attitudes which find expression in judgments of value of the different types (intellectual, ethical and æsthetic) could then be derived, perhaps, by genetic progressions, value movements, from the primary feelings of value. When that point has been reached it may be possible to undertake an evaluation of these different attitudes and their objects, a preliminary contribution to which is given in the very suggestive article of Edith Landmann-Kalischer already referred to, where it is maintained that primary values are objective and that it is possible to distinguish between subjectively and objectively conditioned feelings just as certainly as between subjectively and objectively conditioned perceptions.

¹ L. Dugas, 'Sur les abstraits émotionnels,' *Revue philos.*, 1905, LX.

SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION.

The sixth meeting of the American Philosophical Association was held at Columbia University, New York City, December 27 and 28, 1906, in affiliation with the American Association for the Advancement of Science and a number of other societies. About eighty members of the Association attended the sessions, and a large gathering listened to the reading of the president's address on the afternoon of the 28th in Earl Hall. On the 27th the Association met with the American Psychological Association for the presidential address of the latter society. At the business meeting H. N. Gardiner (Smith) was elected president for the next year, Ralph B. Perry (Harvard) vice-president, and Frank Thilly (Cornell) secretary-treasurer. Ernest Albee (Cornell), Charles M. Bakewell (Yale), and Herbert G. Lord (Columbia) were elected to the Executive Committee, and several new members were admitted to the Association. It was voted to hold the next meeting in Ithaca.

ABSTRACTS OF PAPERS.

President's Address: *The Energies of Men.* WILLIAM JAMES.

This address was printed in full in the *Philosophical Review*, January, 1907.

Some Points of Relation between Music and the Emotions. HALLBERT H. BRITAN.

The æsthetic value of music may lie either (1) in its effect in stimulating and arousing the emotions, or (2) in the pleasure incident to the tonal changes of melodic and harmonic progression. The literature on the subject tends to favor the latter view, while the present paper supports the former. Sounds excite the emotions more than do color and form, and musical sounds partake of this characteristic. The musician can shape the emotional life of his hearers by attention to several distinct factors: rhythm, harmonic modes, resolutions, pitch, and the variations in timbre, tempo, and intensity which form the technique of musical expression. But further, a musical composition may influence the emotions in the same way as an art product of another sort (painting or literature): through the unity in thought and design, the strength and grace in expression, the originality and

significance in the musical thought expressed. That all of these factors are of peculiar emotional significance in music is due (1) to the conceptual vagueness of the organic factors, and (2) to the essentially dynamic nature of these factors. Musical ideas are suggestive rather than expressive; hence they allow a free play of the imagination and of association controlled by emotional congruity; and because they are dynamic rather than static they call forth a response in the most motile aspect of consciousness — the emotions.

The Concreteness of Thought. GEORGE H. SABINE.

While thinkers generally agree that only experience is real, and this only in proportion as it is concrete, current conceptions of concrete experience and of the relation of thought to the concrete differ greatly. Examination of concrete experience shows that it possesses the character of immediacy, but that the immediate must be further qualified as the individual, *i. e.*, as that which possesses the richest possible content. Individuality, however, implies a position in an organized system, and organic unity is similarly a postulate of generalizing thought, for true generalization must reach real synthetic principles. The attempt to define the concrete, therefore, can not stop short of an experience in which universality and individuality are at once completely satisfied — in which perfect integration is combined with perfect differentiation. Only the Absolute, therefore, is fully concrete, and for finite experience the Absolute can only be an ideal of perfected rationality. The concreteness which we attribute to actual experience rests on the fact that such experience is always partially organized. Thought, then, is to be conceived as a function of concrete rationality by which experience is at once universalized and individualized. If this conception is correct, it follows (1) that the notion of a pure experience must be given up; (2) that no distinction in principle can be drawn between reflective and constitutive thought; and (3) that reality is to be conceived, not as pure experience, but as the ideally rational experience which is the goal of thought.

The Nature of Explanation. WALTER T. MARVIN.

Explanation is an analysis of a whole into parts, or of a complexity into elements which are simpler and whose relations are simpler. Four processes are involved in the growth of information: new sensations, association, analytic attention, and comparison; the two latter are preëminently the cognitive processes; that is to say, analysis of the content of apprehension, together with comparison of the elements, is the special work of knowledge. Thus, explanation differs from the other

stages of knowledge merely in thoroughness. Two distinct processes are denoted by the term analysis: (1) Substitution of one content for another — one which seems to us a better or truer presentation or representation of it; (2) analysis proper, which is the work of the analytic attention. This is the process actually involved in explanation. There are two distinct kinds of explanation: analysis (1) of whole into parts, and (2) of complexities into their elements. The first leads to some form of atomic hypothesis, the second to abstract general laws. The paper illustrates these types by examples of well-known scientific theories.

A New Syllogistic Canon. JOHN G. HIBBEN.

This paper will be printed in full in the *Philosophical Review*.

The Aims and Results of the Society for Psychical Research. J. H. HYSLOP.

This paper will be printed in full in the *Journal of the Society for Psychical Research*.

The View that the Real is Control. GUY A. TAWNEY.

(1) In the world of thought, reality is said to be that which controls in the further activities of experience. Reality is made of no other stuff than valid judgments. Judgment is a process through which reality evolves; it is therefore no mere subjective mental state. The last member of the judgment series, indeed, is still untested; there is a realm of uncertainty and possible error — which is, but is not real. That which controls in the logical sense is always objective, but the real is vastly more than the objective. (2) Control in the world of action is usually conceived as external limitation to activity. Such characterizations of the real as 'resistance to muscular effort,' 'limitation of activity,' 'uncontrollableness' imply that the real is a sort of straitjacket of the mind. It was before sentience was, and abides when sentience ceases. The subject or agent is by this definition unreal. The activity is set over against the control. This dualism is clearly stated in Baldwin's doctrine of 'subjective' and 'outer' controls. Such dualism of controls is Kantian so far as it goes. It leads, in some, to the position that the real subject of every judgment is outside the mind, while all that is predicated of it is inside the mind. That which controls in the world of action is always objective but implies much more, which must also be said to belong to the real world. (3) Control in the world of immediacy. Here the real is determined by the free selection of a subject, ego, soul, or spirit. It has both a positive and a negative side — a concentration upon what

satisfies, and withdrawal from what does not satisfy. By means of 'love' and 'will' we reach a point to which thought unaided cannot attain. Once more we are dealing here with what for reflection must be objective and given — the datum of judgment. But it does not exhaust the real. (4) Appeal to the social control does not render the views discussed more tenable, because the social character of the object of knowledge is presupposed by them. That which controls is still the objective only, and cannot be said to be equivalent to the real.

The Ugly Infinite and the Good-for-nothing Absolute. CHARLES M. BAKEWELL.

Philosophy has long been pursued by the antinomy of the Infinite and the Absolute. By the Infinite is here meant the boundless, the endless regress; and by the Absolute the fixed and definite and final, whether as standard of reference, scale of worth, or world of meaning. It is not too much to say that most of the discussions of fundamental problems in philosophy center on this antinomy and that the chief effort of philosophy has been to discover a way of solving it. In earlier times the partisans of the Absolute held sway; but in recent times, owing partly to the conquests made by the theory of evolution in all fields of knowledge, the partisans of the Infinite are coming to be more and more in evidence. Idealists fall into two fairly distinct groups, according as their real-ideal is taken statically or dynamically. The static group may, with some plausibility, be charged with introducing the conception of an Absolute which is useless in the interpretation of experience. Yet even against them, as tested by actual results, the charge cannot be fully made good; and as applied to the dynamic group it is wholly without force. It rests upon the assumptions that, because the idealist believes in a world of eternal truth where values are assessed with finality, he must, in order to make any significant use of such a conception, himself have had this completed vision. But the idealist does not thus 'affect omniscience.' He begins with experience just as he, with all his limitations and ignorance, finds it; but he finds the value of the conception of 'the fixed' in the possibility of working away from this starting-point by definite and sure steps into a world of meaning where nothing is ever lost. Progress is progress, and not merely change, because a less complete view can once for all be set aside in favor of a more complete; and this is clearly intelligible only provided all such views have their position fixed in a scale of worth and meaning which we are gradually finding out, but which we do not make as suits our passing mood or present felt need. This conception is one upon which we lean in every step in our search after truth and reality.

Are Time and Space of Coördinate Philosophical Significance?

H. RUTGERS MARSHALL.

Our concepts of time and space are based upon temporal and spacial experiences. (1) Our temporal experiences are determined by the existence, in connection with presentations, of some phase of time quality, which is a general quality of all presentations, and which, like the algedonic quality (pain-indifference-pleasure), displays three phases: pastness-presentness-futureness. Each specific presentation is discovered to display some one of these if we choose to look for it. The time quality thus appears to be a general quality of all presentations — no presentation is ever timeless. (2) Our spacial experiences are determined by the existence, in connection with presentations, of what we may call the spacial quality. If this were a general quality of all presentations, as the time quality is, then we should find that all presentations are spacially qualified, and that no presentation is non-spacial. But this proves not to be the case: although a large proportion of our presentations are spacially qualified, some are not — for instance, the group of concepts which cannot be traced back to percepts (*e. g.*, 'factor of safety,' 'virtue') and especially the so-called 'feelings of relation' (*e. g.*, what Professor James calls the 'feeling of *but*', which, as he says, is as definitely a presentation as a 'feeling of blue'). These concepts and feelings of relation are definite presentations, but they are not spacially qualified, *i. e.*, they are non-spacial. (3) The temporal quality and the spacial quality thus appear to be on different planes, so to speak; and this leads us to ask whether, in view of the fact that our concepts of time and space are based respectively upon our temporal and spacial experiences, we are justified in classing time and space together and treating them as of coördinate philosophical significance, as is so commonly done.

Some Inadequacies in the Modern Theory of Judgment. W.

H. SHELDON.

The problem of judgment comprises three questions: the make-up of its content (both psychical and logical), the purpose which that content serves, and the fitness of the content to fulfill the purpose. These are the questions of structure, function, and their mutual adaptation. The generally accepted modern theory has revealed the function of the judgment-content (to refer to reality or to suggest action upon the environment); many logicians also have worked out theories of structure (the individual-universal theory, the stimulus-reaction theory, the synthesis theory, the partition theory, etc.), but scarcely any one has

attempted to show how the structure is adapted to the function of suggesting reality. Herein lies the inadequacy of modern theories of judgment.

Descriptive and Normative Sciences. ERNEST ALBEE.

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Knowledge as Immediate Experience and a Function of Love.

LEWIS F. HITE.

The reflective knowledge of concrete experience is more or less systematic, but such knowledge presupposes immediate knowledge as its basis. Immediate knowledge is a unique, simple, complete experience, which contains in itself, unified and harmonized, all the complexity, variety, and relations that subsequently grow out of it by the developing processes of attention, reflection, analysis, and synthesis. Experience has two aspects, cognitive and emotional. (1) The cognitive is that which is presented in the function of self-representation. Experience, in its first intention, is immediately self-conscious. The paper examines in detail the nature of immediate knowledge by means of a construction which supposes a man placed under conditions where the only experience he can have is that of the blue sky. Then the situation is developed by adding sound, and finally by supposing all the senses to be opened at once. It is assumed in this case that there would be complete blending, and that the experience would be of the same type as the simple blue. It is maintained that the cognitive aspect of this experience is its existence as its own precise, unique kind or quality. (2) The emotional, æsthetic, and voluntary aspects of the experience are interpreted and developed as characters which are otherwise covered by the general term love. Love, in accordance with Swedenborg's doctrine, is taken as the fundamental and all-inclusive experience; experience at bottom is love, and all the functions and characters of experience are developments of love. Love, in the process of self-representation, presents that aspect of experience which we call knowledge. Knowledge, as a complete systematic whole, would be the final stage of this process of self-representation.

Cadwallader Colden of King's College. I. WOODBRIDGE RILEY.

A sketch of the life and doctrines of Cadwallader Colden (1688-1776).

Philosophy and Religion. A. T. ORMOND. (Read by title.)

The Meaning of Moral Goodness. RALPH B. PERRY.

The aim of the present paper is the elucidation of the real moral

goodness contained in experience but only imperfectly discerned in moral sentiment and opinion. To define moral goodness it is necessary to distinguish a field of moral values within which moral good, evil, and indifference are systematically related. Values which approximate morality appear when an organism is introduced into a mechanical system. Mechanical objects and action now bear favorably, unfavorably, or indifferently upon the organism's preservation, and are said to be good, bad, or indifferent accordingly; these values are strictly extrinsic. At the same time there appear the values proper to the organism itself. The elementary organism is an organization whose action is determined, at any rate in part, by the law of its own preservation; such action possesses value through its reflex consequences, whether beneficial, injurious, or indifferent. Goodness, badness, and indifference of this type may be termed *biological* values. *Moral* value arises only when the simple interests of the elementary organism become differentiated or affiliated in such wise as to form higher synthetic interests. Differentiation appears in the ease of the individual self, affiliation in the case of the social group. In both cases the sub-interest possesses moral value in consideration of its bearing upon the controlling interest: insofar as the sub-interest contributes to the controlling interest, it possesses moral goodness; insofar as it detracts, it possesses moral evil; and insofar as it is inappreciable in either respect, it possesses moral indifference. Moral value in the above sense may be attributed to interested action or conduct, to self-determining individuals or selves, to institutions, social groups, ideals, and principles.

A Factor in the Evolution of Morality. F. C. FRENCH.

Action for the good of others, determined by instincts, habits, sympathetic impulses, and the like, appeared at an early stage of animal life; but conscience, as a sense of duty and personal responsibility, does not emerge until a considerably later period in human development. Many facts point to the view that primitive self-consciousness was a group-consciousness rather than an individual self-consciousness. This paper aims to show that the first rudimentary form of moral obligation is found in the taboo idea. At a later stage of religious development (*e. g.*, among the Hebrews) the taboos are regarded as commands of the Deity, but this is an *ex post facto* explanation. Earlier than any organized religion man learns to dread and avoid the mysteriously dangerous. 'Touch not the unclean thing,' is the first categorical imperative. This primitive imperative, ethical in form but for the most part unethical in content, affords exactly the

stepping-stone we need to bridge the chasm between the non-moral and the moral. The ethical value of taboo is that it gave the first impulse to the birth of that sense of oughtness which has made man a responsible moral being. Taboo is conscience in embryo.

Some Requisites of a Theory of Ethical Values. WALTER G. EVERETT. (Read by title.)

MEETING OF THE SOUTHERN SOCIETY.

The second meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology was held on Friday, December 28, 1906, in Montgomery, Alabama, in connection with the annual meeting of the Southern Educational Association. Owing to a variety of unexpected causes, the attendance was not large, and most of the papers which had been offered for this meeting were not read. Dr. J. H. Pearce, of the Alabama Brenau, presented 'An Interpretation of some Sensory Illusions,' in which he undertook to generalize the dominance of secondary over primary stimuli in several types of illusions in terms of the law of gravity and to show that it applies to objects of consciousness as well as to objects in the spatial world. Miss Celestia S. Parrish reported the new and enlarged equipment of the psychological laboratory at the State Normal School, Athens, Georgia, and sketched some of the problems under investigation. Professor E. F. Buchner presented a report on the progress of psychology during the current year (published in the January issue of the *BULLETIN*).

The following were, upon nomination by the Council, elected to membership in the Society: Dr. Mary K. Benedict, Sweet Briar Institute for Women; Professor Charles C. J. Bennett, Louisiana State University; Professor A. B. Coffee, William and Mary College; Professor Frederick Eby, Baylor University; Professor John G. Harrison, Mercer University; Professor Williston S. Hough, George Washington University; Professor Elmer E. Jones, Virginia Female Normal School; Professor M. A. Martin, Woman's College, Richmond, Va.; Dr. J. F. Messenger, Virginia Female Normal School; and Professor R. M. Ogden, University of Tennessee.

In the absence of a majority of the members of the Council, the Society voted to ratify such action as to officers for next year as the Council may subsequently take.

PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

BALDWIN'S FUNCTIONAL LOGIC.

Thought and Things or Genetic Logic. JAMES MARK BALDWIN. 3 vols. Vol. I., *Functional Logic.* London, Swan, Sonnenschein & Company; New York, Macmillan Company, 1906. Pp. xiv + 273.

This is the most comprehensive attempt in Logic yet made in America. Aside from the question of its success — which of course cannot be passed upon until the remaining and larger portions of the work appear — the fact that such a program is offered, and the general standpoint and method of the treatment are further evidence that philosophy in America is rapidly passing from the absorbing, translating, albeit necessary, period of German apprenticeship into a free and initiative adulthood.

As has been so repeatedly pointed out by various writers representing the so-called 'pragmatic' movement, the most obvious and immediate field for reconstructive applications of the 'instrumental' view of thought is the field in which the movement started — logic. The view that regards thought as supporting and supported by the other phases of experience, rather than as a wholly independent strand, patently calls for an account of the *way* in which the other 'modes' of experience condition and are conditioned by thought and of the *way* in which the various stages of thought determine each other, — in short, for a 'genetic logic.' This, in general, is the task Professor Baldwin has undertaken.

However, Professor Baldwin wishes it understood at the start — though one would not have to read far to discover the fact for himself — that he is not a 'pragmatist' in any 'alarming' sense of the term. Indeed, 'pragmatism' is freely criticised throughout the volume. Whether in these rejections of pragmatism Professor Baldwin succeeds in avoiding a static absolutism, which he also explicitly disavows, will be clearer in the end.

The scope of the work is not confined to the stages and processes of reflection as such, but aims to follow the entire history of the cognitive function through what are called the 'pre-logical,' 'quasi-logical,' 'logical-proper' and 'hyper-logical' stages. The present volume

contains the treatment of the first two of these periods under the general title of *Functional Logic*. Volume II. with the caption *Genetic Theory of Thought or Experimental Logic*, is to deal with the problem of truth and falsity. Volume III. *Genetic Logic of Reality*, will treat of the relation of thought to reality — 'carrying the treatment into the hyper-logical functions — æsthetic, rational, etc., drawing conclusions for real logic and philosophy.'

Even these bare headings, especially those of 'Experimental' and 'Real' logic, tempt one to speculations on the implications of such divisions — speculations which must, however, be suppressed until the appearance of the other volumes. It is indeed difficult enough to interpret justly the immediate contents of the present volume without its complements. The meaning of many terms, especially some of Professor Baldwin's new ones and his new uses of old ones in this first volume, may be clearer when the descriptions of the later stages appear.

Passing to the contents of the volume, perhaps the most significant part of the introduction is the statement of what are called the 'axioms and postulates' of 'genetic science,' and the 'canons' of genetic logic. These contain a recognition of two or three important conceptions. First, that development, evolution, is an actual movement in *reality* — not mere appearance, nor an unrolling of an already determined 'implicit' reality. This is expressed in the 'Canon of actuality' and 'the Fallacy of the implicit' (p. 24), and on page 13 where we are told that explanatory logic 'studies thought as instrumental to a genetically built up and evolving reality' in contrast with 'speculative logic of the metaphysicians' which 'makes the logical nature of reality the prius.' From this it follows that every cognitive content and 'mode' must be evaluated in its own context, and is not to be referred to an ultimate type nor taken as an absolute type for other modes and contents. Yet these thoroughly developmental passages are immediately followed by this: "It [explanatory logic] may find the all-inclusive and *ultimate* meaning of experience to be given — not in the thought mode but in a hyper-logical, an æsthetic or even mystical mode of experience" (Italics mine). That the thought 'mode' is ever passing into a mode of the immediate type which may perhaps be called 'æsthetic' has been the nerve of 'pragmatic' doctrines from the beginning. But how, if reality is essentially developmental, can the æsthetic be any more 'ultimate' than any other mode and how is there to be found here or anywhere else an 'ultimate' and 'all-inclusive' meaning? This perhaps is one of the questions that should

await the other volumes. But there are enough of such passages in this volume to make the reader wonder whether Professor Baldwin's conception of 'a developmental reality' is not still paying tribute to static absolutism.

Returning to the exposition, the cognitive function is traced through the following modes which traverse the four general stages given above: The 'sense-mode'; image-mode, including memory and fancy; play-mode; substantive-mode; subject-mode — reflection; logical-mode, including belief and predication; æsthetic-mode; ethical-mode. Each of these modes has its corresponding content or object — 'sense-object,' 'image-object,' etc.

Professor Baldwin begins with what he calls the 'presentative' or 'projective' as the primitive cognitive content. In the first account this primitive content appears to be absolutely given. It simply appears in Professor Baldwin's own figure 'as a panorama.' But further along we find that 'selection,' 'discrimination,' and therefore representation are involved. We are told (pp. 132 and 137) that this '*primum cognitum*' must always *mean* something; that in it 'there are always both complications of content and fulfillments of interest.' This means, of course, that this '*primum cognitum*' is as much representative as presentative or 'projective'; that sense perception and memory begin and develop together.

This suggests that in his treatment Professor Baldwin follows what Caird calls the method of 'regression,' in which earlier statements are constantly revised and supplemented by the results of the later exposition. Doubtless for non-absolute beings under the necessity of presenting a simultaneous development in a serial form, this method, to a certain extent, is unavoidable. But, in using it, the earlier statements should be carefully qualified in order to protect the reader from confusion and the author from misinterpretation.

In this account of the primitive object the author criticises 'the writings of Professor Dewey and others,' which have attempted to state the object in terms of the interruption — or, to use Professor Baldwin's term, the 'embarrassment' — of habit and the reconstructive activities of attention. He says this cannot always be done; 'for it often happens that a new and unwelcome object simply forces itself upon us' (p. 50). But why should this 'forced' character prevent a statement of the object in terms of habit and attention? It seems scarcely more than the time-honored statement of apperception to say that, however 'unwelcome' or 'forced' the object may be, it cannot 'get into' consciousness by any other way than the already existing

and active system of habits and attention. And that a new object could not be constructed in consciousness without some degree of interruption and reconstruction of the preexisting coördination would seem equally obvious. All this is from the standpoint of the ordinary dualism of organism, including 'a mind,' and environment from which Professor Baldwin seems to write much of the time. But if now we conceive of that activity which *includes* organism and environment as a vast moving complex of habit and attention, then we may state the *entire* nature and significance of the object in terms of those functions. Moreover, it is noteworthy that Professor Baldwin himself finds the *motif* for all his further important differentiations, such as inner-outer, mind-body, subject-object, etc., precisely in the 'embarrassments,' 'failures,' 'ambiguities,' etc., arising in the preceding stages. (Cf. pp. 186-240, 244, 253 ff.)

The account of the 'image-mode' is very suggestive — especially the conception of play as the forerunner of reflection. The free activity of imagery in play is made the analogue of the process of the construction of hypotheses. Whether the reader accepts all of the author's statements of the criteria of the differentiations of inner and outer, fact and fancy, physical and psychical, object and subject, he must agree that the discussion is timely in view of the constant confusion of these distinctions.

Some readers may feel that after the introduction the author might well have begun with Chapter VII., on 'Meaning.' For it here appears that all cognitive content must be or have meaning. This also accounts for the fact that a considerable measure of the preceding exposition is repeated in this chapter. Some readers of this chapter may be confused by the double use of the term *meaning*. In the beginning we are well told that 'It is in the passage from bare recognition of each item as being what it is, to its treatment as being not what it is, but what it *may become or be used as* that psychic meanings as such arise' (p. 131). On the other hand the term 'meaning' is used throughout for simple content of any kind apart from this pointing or referring function which we have read is the very essence of meaning. In this second sense of the term we are told that the content is simply 'found to *be just what it means*' (p. 131). Of course a thing can both be and mean at the same time, but that it can be *what it means* is quite another and to the reviewer an impossible affair. Professor Baldwin himself explicitly raises the point under the question, 'are meaningless objects possible?' (pp. 137 and 185). His answer is: 'Theoretically, yes; ' 'practically, no,' 'since the changes in the life of

concrete thought are so constantly occurring . . . that such neutrality *is really never realized* ' (italics mine). Now if we believe this is *actually* the case, why this 'theoretical' conception to the contrary? Where we do *not* know what 'really is' we may fill in with hypothetical conceptions. But we surely do not construct hypothetical conceptions of a situation which we *have already accepted* as quite otherwise.

The chapter on 'negative meaning' is one of the best parts of this discussion and also illustrates further the 'regressive' method by carrying back into the preceding stage the needed element of 'embarrassment,' 'ambiguity,' etc. They are here given a central position which they maintain, with occasional lapses, throughout the rest of the volume though apparently without the author's explicit recognition of this position.

The next chapter is on the 'substantive mode,'—the stage in which the mind-body dualism develops. It begins with an account of how this distinction develops from the earlier ones of 'inner and outer' and of 'images and things.' The earlier dualisms belong to the pre-experimental period when experience is relatively uncontrolled, where the 'outer' is simply the sense content into which memory images *happen* to be convertible, the 'inner' being the images which *happen* to be unconverted or unconvertible, *i. e.*, 'images detached from their suggested termini' (p. 88). But as the experimental — the hypothetical — function of imagery develops, there comes to be more and more detachment of these images from immediate fulfillment and consequently more continuity and solidarity in them until they get a substantiation as 'mind.' On the other hand this is accompanied by a corresponding regularity and dependableness in the sense content into which these images are convertible until it is substantiated as 'body.' Mind-body is then the scientific correlative of the pre-scientific 'inner-outer.'

At this point the treatment takes up the nature of general and universal meaning which is held to belong to this chapter since "Those meanings involve cognition of relation and it is by the progression into the 'substantive mode' that this is first achieved." There is room for discussion of this point but I must pass on to Professor Baldwin's conception of general and universal which, I think, is unusual. He has identified generality and universality with verification,—proof. In the experimental stage of thought certain contents are selected as hypotheses — as 'instrumental.' But 'these are individuated as schematic not as general or universal' (p. 215). 'Schematic' means that

a content is serving as a 'schema' for the interpretation and organization of new material. It is hypothetical. Then if this statement—that such a content is not general nor universal—referred to the pre-scientific stage in which a child might call a horse 'a big dog' or expect to be burnt by an orange, thus using dog and the color of the candle flame as 'schemata,' one could readily agree that such a 'schema' is no *logical* general nor universal. But we are explicitly told that this interpretation is to apply to 'the term hypothesis *as scientific thinkers use it*' (italic mine). The distinction is further elaborated as follows: "As meanings the 'schema' and the general or concept are distinguished as one *selective* and *prospective*, the other *recognitive* and *retrospective*. . . . One is an expectation, the other is a fulfillment. It is, in the latter progression [and this is the scientific stage], the difference between conjecture and truth; . . . between research and the assertion of proof; between utility and reasonableness" (brackets mine). In passing one wonders what the antithesis between a 'research hypothesis' and reasonableness can mean. One of the 'rules' in the text-books of logic is that 'the hypothesis must be reasonable.' To be sure all utility is not reasoned, *e. g.*, the case of the burnt child, etc. But, to put a scientific hypothesis as a case of mere utility over against 'reasonableness,' seems to imply a 'pure' reason which would seem strange in a 'functional logic.'

Of course a writer is always free to give terms new connotations. But when he does, he must carefully cover the ground of the old connotation. If the 'schema' as a scientific hypothesis is neither general nor universal, what is it? It surely is not 'singular' nor is it 'particular' by the definition of the latter (p. 231). Professor Baldwin says (p. 271) it is 'just a hypothetical meaning' which becomes general when verified. Thus the hypothesis 'horse,' which I apply to an object about which I am uncertain, becomes general when verified; when 'I treat the horse to sugar beware of his legs,' etc. But this reads very much like the usual descriptions of the way in which experience passes out of the 'general' into the specific and concrete where the general or universal as such ceases to exist. Surely the horse to which I feed sugar etc. is not 'general.' To be sure the material of my hypothesis must have an established character; it must already have definition—otherwise of course it could not serve as an idea—as a 'schema.' But this established, defined character does not in itself make it general. Its generality consists in its *use* to define and further develop new material. In other words, it would seem that the selection, the construction of the hypothesis is the very essence of the act

of generalization. Again, the universal is simply a 'general' which: (1) is 'irrevocable'; (2) 'admits of no exceptions' (p. 224). If these statements be applied to the universal as the hypothesis *in* the act of reasoning, meaning thereby that as used *in this problem* the hypothetical content must preserve a steadfast character — must be consistent, there is no difficulty. But if taken absolutely they must make trouble for a 'dynamic view of reality.'

An interesting corollary of this view of 'general' and 'universal' appears in its relation to idealization (pp. 232 ff.). Ideal content is well described as that which serves as an 'aim' — an 'intent' or as the selector and organizer of some other content. Idealization is thus concerned with change — adaptation. But the general and universal are the fixed and the irrevocable. Professor Baldwin does not blink the conclusion which he states thus: 'The general is a finished retrospective, relational meaning from which in its very conception ideal reference is excluded!' (p. 236).

The last chapter, which is one of the most stimulating in the volume, is an account of the genesis of the subject-object dualism and the transition to the logical stage proper. The rise of the subject-object distinction is due to 'embarrassments' arising in the mind-body antithesis. My own body is both outer and inner, physical and mental. Nor 'can I treat another's body simply as body, equivalent to thing, for it means to me thing plus the characters of capriciousness, activity etc., which are the essence of my meaning of mind' (p. 253). On the other hand mind is equally ambiguous — is equally inner and outer, whether my own or another's. The solution of these 'ambiguities' with their resulting 'embarrassments' is found by both sides of these antitheses renouncing their substantive character and becoming ideas — free 'detached,' 'objective' contents in a world of thought, or, as Professor Baldwin calls it, of 'experience.' So that '*on occasion this or that meaning or interpretation may be given the exclusive place which the dominant interest or the germane context of the moment determines.*' This is properly called 'the standpoint of reflection.' For in the stage of forming and testing hypotheses all experience is regarded as *possibly* ideal. Everything is grist for the logical mill.

But Professor Baldwin finds yet another important characteristic of the logical stage. These ideas must be ideas to and for a subject. This subject is constituted by the 'effort' — the 'activity' element (p. 259) which thus appears, contrary to the doctrine of many psychologists — the author among them — to be taken out of the idea, leaving the latter a mere passive content. To be an idea then means to be an

'experience' of and for a subject. Hence the author's characterization of the logical stage as that of 'experience.'

The reader will probably find 'difficulties' in this chapter. One of the most obvious is that although these ideal contents are supposed to have surrendered their antithetical characters so as to leave them free for determination as the specific occasion may require,—yet we find (p. 268) that '*this entire content is thought as inner content.*' Yet again (p. 270) we read that these ideas 'are represented by the process of thought *as in their original mode.*' Apparently, then, the earlier antithesis of inner-outer still remains and yet is somehow all 'inner.'

There is a similar difficulty besetting the meaning of 'objective' and 'psychic.' There exists apparently a complete subject-object relation between the subject as constituted by 'effort' and the world of ideas, which is described as 'a related whole' (p. 271). Yet there is still another 'extra psychic' world with 'real coefficients' to which the inner 'objective' world of ideas refers and "which holds the entire system [*i. e.*, this 'inner' subject-object system as above described] to its original moorings." "The system is experience and my experience, but the experiences mean existences and the ideas mean things" (p. 262). As above in the case of the 'inner' so here there are apparently two subject-object relationships: one between the inner subject as 'effort and its ideas'; the other between, either these ideas and the things they 'mean' or between this whole 'inner' subject-object 'system' and the world of things.

Doubtless some of these perplexities represent, as usual, the reviewer's 'personal equation' and some may disappear in the other volumes. At all events, as was said in the beginning, the significance of the aim, the standpoint and general method of the treatment, together with the suggestive special features mentioned and others unmentioned, make the work a notable one. A. W. MOORE.

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TRUTH.

The Ambiguity of Truth. F. C. S. SCHILLER. Mind, N. S., 1906, XV., 161-176.

The aim of this article is stated by Mr. Schiller in his first sentence: "To bring to a clear issue the conflict of opinion as to the nature of the conception of 'truth.'" From a preliminary analysis it appears that 'truth' is a habit peculiar to man, and that the conception of 'truth' is allied to that of the 'good' and of the 'beautiful.' Further, it becomes evident that by 'truth' is meant the totality of

truths which, while deceptively claiming to be true, are often false. This leaves us with an important ambiguity, for inasmuch as a claim to truth is inherent in every assertion as such, 'truth' comes to mean both the formal unverified claim and the claim which has stood the test of validation. How may we discriminate between the unsupported claim and the accepted truth? The answer to this question is gained, not from intellectualistic or formal logic, but from an inquiry into the formation of sciences, the making of truth. Each science has its specific subject-matter and method. Moreover, the *purpose* constituting that science, what we want to know from it, determines the relevancy of the answers to our questions. The 'true' answer promotes the purpose, the 'false' thwarts it. Thus 'truth' is a form of value, and has reference to a defined purpose. 'Objective' truth is guaranteed by the arbitrament of society, and by the natural tendency to subordinate all purposes to the Supreme Good. Pragmatism gives us the criterion of evaluating truth when it states that in all knowing the *consequences* of an assertion stamp it as 'true' or 'false.' That, therefore, the 'true' must be the 'good,' 'useful' and 'practical' is the rationale of pragmatism. This pragmatic view of truth as logical value results in a unification of experience and in a symmetrical classification of the sciences. The article concludes with a twofold challenge to intellectualist logicians: (1) How do they propose to validate a claim to truth and to distinguish such a claim from an established truth? (2) What do they propose, in denying the cogency of the pragmatic method, to substitute as a test?

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MEANING.

Ueber das Verstehen von Worten und Sätzen. CLIFTON C. TAYLOR.

Zeitsch. für Psychol. u. Physiol. d. Sinn., 1905, XL., 225-251.

Dr. Taylor presents us with the results of his experiments on the understanding of words. Some new points are well brought out and it is these which I wish to emphasize. By presenting a series of tests, and by studying carefully the introspective evidence as offered by the subjects, he found the following:

- I. For the understanding of perceptual sentences (sentences representing perceptual objects), a series of perceptual images is all that is necessary (p. 235).
- II. This facilitation of the understanding of perceptual sentences by means of perceptual images is lessened when the objects represented by the sentences are already known (p. 236).

III. The understanding of abstract sentences is arrested by the presence of perceptual images (p. 239).

IV. The images present in the understanding of a text are fewer when the objects mentioned in the text are more numerous (p. 241).

V. Grammatical construction may operate as a hindrance in the understanding of a sentence (p. 245).

VI. The more common the text is, the less filled is the content of the thought moment (p. 246).

VII. Certain pauses seem to be necessary in the understanding of sentences.

VIII. The connectives in the sentences seem to facilitate understanding without any special experience which can be analyzed out of the conscious moment as being concomitant with such connectives. They seem to function without a definite content.

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ÆSTHETICS.

Essais d'esthétique empirique. VERNON LEE. *Revue Philosophique*, 1905, LIX., 46-60, 133-146.

The author's purpose is to recount her own æsthetic evolution, to suggest to others the problems and hypotheses incident to her own investigations, and to offer a method of research. The author makes application to æsthetics of the methods of individual and empirical psychology. These articles consist substantially of notes taken in various museums of painting and sculpture from April 15, 1901, to May 20, 1904, by herself and two of her pupils, all three differing in race, age and education.

Vernon Lee's own notes show her chief problems to have been (1) how one goes about studying a statue, how one follows its lines and plan; (2) the nature of our reaction to statues good or bad; (3) finally, what associations and sentiments are revived or imitated thereby. Her earlier observations were based on Greek statuary. She attached little importance to the internal imitation of the pose of the statue. Such a tendency is due to one's completing very rapidly an imperfect visual impression by means of the experiences stored up within ourselves. Persons who pay little attention to the form as such (lines, plan), seem more sensible of the dramatic, emotional expressiveness of the work. Consider, for example, that idea with reference to the 'Laocoön.' The author's experience before the Niobe of Subiace, the Apoxyomenos of Leyuppis, the Amazon of Polyclitus,

and the Satyr of Praxiteles, besides others of like superiority, lead the author to conclude that only statues of inferior quality arouse in us an imitative tendency. On the other hand that tendency is strongly aroused by statues of the second rank. It is their peculiarity of appearing to be actively occupied that renders them so disquieting, and prevents us from fixing our attention on them. Their action becomes painful because it is never completed, whereas our mimetic faculty demands the second moment of action. The movement that we attribute to such examples as the Doryphorus and the Apoxyomenos is purely that of lines which ascend, widen, and support while we remain calm before them, or which change according as we move around the statue.

The power that every plastic form representative of the human form possesses of awakening in us every kind of sentiment that we experience before the human reality is due to the revival of images saturated with the purely human emotions that have accompanied the sight of the human reality. That emotion of human quality, as distinguished from the æsthetic emotion as such, will be in inverse proportion to the attention that we give the plastic work in itself. In the normal state, the perception of the form is probably a subconscious process accompanying the very conscious process of discovering either the thing represented by that form, or the use of the object possessing that form. From the psychical fusion that takes place results a difficulty of giving an account of the form, and a facility for giving an account of the subject of the work.

Several notable differences between art and nature are stated. (1) In a museum the visual stimulus is an object possessing an 'accent' much more definite and vigorous than the 'natural objects' possess. That accounts for the detachment of works of art from their surroundings. (2) The relationship that exists between figures in art and their surroundings practically does not exist in real life. In the latter case those different elements are bound together by a judgment of our experience, by the logical relationship; whereas in the former case they are bound together by an æsthetic affinity by the proper interaction of forces. (3) The artist turns natural forms into conventional form. Hence arises the theory of an artist's 'line' so-called, *e. g.*, the 'line' of Leonardo or of Botticelli.

The unexpected pleasure derived by the writer from a picture of Angelico's, hitherto unknown to her, and the disagreeable impression caused by another picture of the same artist's, this one well-known to the writer, gave rise to the question whether other activities than the

æsthetic are implied in the appreciation of artistic form. The writer believes that the action of the new on the æsthetic sentiment is due to the putting in motion of our activity of exploration. It is possible that the maximum of appreciation may be reached by the 'unexpected recognition of a thing already familiar.' In such a case we investigate at the same time that we synthesize, whereas when the object and its nature are unknown, there is a movement of exploration but not of synthesis. If the work of art furnishes our activities with only one element, the other interests, however trifling, existing in our lives will offer more or less resistance to the æsthetic interest. The action of art is not hypnotic and mono-ideistic; it is in the highest degree synthetic. Though in fact the first function of art is to 'exclude,' that function is performed by art's enclosing of the attention in a very complex and complete labyrinth where all our activities cross and re-cross without isolating and avoiding each other.

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IDEALS.

The Genesis of Ideals. ARTHUR ERNEST DAVIES. Jour. of Phil., Psych. and Sci. Meth., 1906, VIII., 482-495.

Before treating of the development of ideals, Mr. Davies shows the confusion existing in the naturalistic and the theological treatment. "With the one, the ideal has an objective character, an existence outside the individual consciousness, to which the individual consciousness may approach, but which it may not comprehend" (p. 483). But this places the ideal beyond the life of men. "With the other, the ideal must find its place within the experience of those in whom it is operative, but then it is no longer an ideal, but just a bit of the common experience of common men. On this view, the only improvement is self-improvement" (p. 483).

Mr. Davies then makes an effort to find the actual state of affairs by attempting to improve Professor Baldwin's theory of imitation. Imitation does not, so says Mr. Davies, account for the phenomena of differentiation in social organization. Imitation is always a reproductive affair (p. 485). Mr. Davies works out symbolically this idea of change as follows: "There is, as we conceive it, a contrast between a presented content *B*—the person who is doing the unusual thing—and a represented content *a*—the person who usually does what is now being done—mediated through the act of undressing, etc.—*xyz*. What is getting done—*xyz*—calls up the image of *A*—*a*—

which fails to get verified in the child's experience through the presence of *B*. Or, to put it another way, and at the same time to emphasize another aspect of the case, *B* arouses the expectation *pqr* which fails to get realized through the substitution of *xyz*. But *xyz* calls up *a*, and thereby throws into conflict, by the meaning each has come to have in experience, two previously emphasized points of the environment *A* and *B*. These, as we understand, are the conditions under which on the basis of imitation both intellectual and moral development normally takes place. Intellectually, the problem means that the judgments of value, *B* is *pqr* and *A* is *xyz*, must give place to a higher synthesis through which *pqr* and *xyz* may both serve as predicates qualifying the same subject *B*. Morally, the same situation may be interpreted as one of allowing, through growth in mental faculty, an ideal element — *a* — to serve as a reconstructive factor in behavior in the given relation *B* — *pqr*" (p. 488).

All this is quite correct and, barring its symbolical dress, well put. But does it really differ much from Baldwin's statements as seen throughout his *Social and Ethical Interpretations*? I need cite only one to show the similarity.

"We may say that each of the situations which arises from his effort to reproduce the copy is an invention of the child's. It is so because he works it out; no one else in the world knows it or can reproduce it. He aims, it is true, not at anything new; he aims at the thing the copy set for him to imitate. But what he does differs both from this and from anything he has ever done before. It is a synthesis of old material, of his old pictures of finger-movements, in this case, with the new picture presented to his eye, and his old strains of muscle, shortness of breath, rushing of blood, setting of glottis, bending of joints, etc. But the outcome — that is new. . . . He has a new thing to contemplate and he is withal a new person to contemplate it."¹ This statement is but one of many.

As regards the function of the ideal in life, Mr. Davies brings out well the contrast between the static view of Hume, and the functional view. From the naturalistic view of Hume, the ideal can only be a content of consciousness, and so can have no functional value. But we must consider the ideal both as a bit of experience and as transcendent. The ideal is transcendent in that it is a content qualitatively distinct from the presented material of consciousness. "This difference is indicated by the term — idea — which is used to describe this class of content." (p. 493).

¹ *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*, § 65.

So far as we can see from the discussion of Mr. Davies, the point which he wishes to emphasize is that the ideal is a functional transcendent unit, based upon individual experience and differing from such experience. But his interpretation of Baldwin's theory of imitation seems somewhat askew. This, however, by no means interferes with the excellence of his treatment, as such. FELIX ARNOLD.

NEW YORK CITY.

CODE OF HONOR.

The College Woman's Code of Honor. AMY E. TANNER. Ped. Sem., 1906, XIII., Pp. 104-117.

A number of questions regarding what the answerer would do in various situations that are likely to occur and involving petty temptations and fine moral discrimination were given to the young women of several women's colleges and co-educational colleges. The answers from 440 students indicate that one half would condemn keeping carfare uncalled for, using a 'pony,' using a point accidentally seen on another's paper during an examination, and telling stories to a credulous girl, while the rest would defend such action or decide variously according to the exact circumstances of the case. There is little condemnation of 'bluffing' in recitations, telling white lies, exaggerating, or the acceptance of unduly favorable opinions of self. The college girl has a thoroughgoing contempt for sneaking and out and out lying, but with sufficient intelligence and sense of humor in most cases to enjoy any sort of contest with wits even though she risks her scholarly reputation.

Socially she is on the whole warm hearted enough to sacrifice the truth in small matters to the demands of friendship and courtesy, but rarely has she sufficient social sense to undertake the punishment of a wrong doer. The author emphasizes the need of more democracy and self government in school and college. E. A. KIRKPATRICK.

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BOOKS RECEIVED FROM FEBRUARY 5 TO MARCH 5.

Textbook of Psychiatry. E. MENDEL. Trans. by W. C. KRAUSS. Philadelphia, Davis Co., 1907. Pp. xiv + 311.

The Psychology of Public Speaking. W. D. SCOTT. Pearson Bros. (No place or date.) Pp. 222.

Philosophical Problems in the Light of Vital Organization. E. MONTGOMERY. New York & London, Putnam, 1907. Pp. 462.

Structure and Growth of the Mind. W. MITCHELL. London & New York, Macmillan, 1907. Pp. xxxv + 512.

Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic. J. N. KEYNES. (4th ed. rewrit. and enl.) London & New York, Macmillan, 1906.

NOTES AND NEWS.

WE have received the preliminary announcement of an International Congress of Psychiatry, Neurology, Psychology, and Care of the Insane, to be held at Amsterdam, September 2-7. The international coöperating committee includes Dr. G. Alder Blumer, Professor Joseph Jastrow, and Dr. Louise G. Robinowitch from this country. Those desiring to attend the congress are requested to communicate with the general secretaries, Drs. J. Van Deventer Szn. and G. Van Wayenburg, Prinzengracht 717, Amsterdam, enclosing their cards and membership fee (\$4.15). Abstracts of papers should be submitted by May 1.

THE publication of the *Rivista Filosofica* (founded by the late Carlo Cantoni) will be continued by a board consisting of A. Faggi, E. Juvalta, G. Mantovani, G. Vidari, and G. Villa. (Manuscripts and subscriptions to Professor Juvalta, Corso Garibaldi 56, Pavia.)

THE psychological clinic conducted in connection with the laboratory of psychology at the University of Pennsylvania announces a new journal, *The Psychological Clinic*, to be issued monthly excepting July, August, and September, with about 300 pages to the volume, the size and general style being similar to the PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN. (Subsc. \$1, Lightner Witmer, Editor, Station B., Philadelphia.)

American Philosophy—The Early Schools, by Dr. I. Woodbridge Riley, is announced by Dodd, Mead & Co. for immediate publication. It is the first volume of an extended work based on original sources and unpublished documents—the fruit of Dr. Riley's research as Johnston Research Scholar at the Johns Hopkins University.

PROFESSOR JOSIAH ROYCE, of Harvard University, delivered a series of five lectures at the University of Illinois during the last week of January on the topic, 'Loyalty as an Ethical Principle.' During his stay at Urbana, Professor Royce also addressed the Philosophical Club on the topic, 'What Sort of Reality have Mathematical Truths and Ideas?' Professor William James delivered a series of eight

lectures before the department of philosophy and psychology at Columbia University on the topic, 'Pragmatism: a New Name for an Old Way of Thinking.' Professor G. H. Palmer, of the same University, recently delivered a series of lectures at the University of Kansas on 'Theories of Conscience.'

DR. R. P. ANGIER, of the Department of Psychology at Yale, will lecture March 26-29 on the subject 'Some Tendencies in Modern Psychology' at the University of California.

A SERIES of lectures on 'Socialism' was delivered in February by W. H. Mallock, of England, at Columbia University, in coöperation with the Public Lecture Bureau of the National Civic Federation.

THE following are taken from the press:

DR. P. J. MÖBIUS, the author of many works on psychological and pathological topics, died recently at Leipzig at the age of fifty-three years.

DR. ERNST MEUMANN, of Königsberg, has been called to the chair of philosophy at Münster as successor to Professor Busse.

DR. DICKINSON S. MILLER, now lecturer in philosophy, has been made professor of philosophy at Columbia University.

THE EDITORS of the REVIEW announce the completion of arrangements for the issue of a new series of Monographs, planned on the lines of the *Psychological Monograph Series* already issued. The new series will be devoted to philosophical papers, and will bear the title *Philosophical Monographs of the Psychological Review*. The two series will proceed side by side, being devoted to more extended papers on psychological and philosophical topics, respectively. We are glad to offer to authors and university departments this wider channel of publication on the terms heretofore extended in connection with the old series. Manuscripts and correspondence with reference to the printing of Monographs should be addressed as follows:

For the series of *Psychological Monographs*, to
PROFESSOR C. H. JUDD, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

For the series of *Philosophical Monographs*, to
PROFESSOR J. MARK BALDWIN, Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Md.